

L Number	Hits	Search Text	DB	Time stamp
1	2787	713/174.cccls. or 713/185.cccls. or 713/192.cccls. or 713/194.cccls. or 713/200-201.cccls. or 713/155.cccls. or 713/168.cccls.	USPAT	2003/12/19 14:56
2	660	705/60.cccls. or 705/62.cccls. or 705/63.cccls. or 705/401.cccls. or 705/408.cccls. or 705/405.cccls. or 705/60.cccls. or 705/410.cccls. or 705/404.cccls.	USPAT	2003/12/19 14:57
3	549	380/51.cccls. or 380/54.cccls.	USPAT	2003/12/19 14:58
4	3882	(713/174.cccls. or 713/185.cccls. or 713/192.cccls. or 713/194.cccls. or 713/200-201.cccls. or 713/155.cccls. or 713/168.cccls.) or (705/60.cccls. or 705/62.cccls. or 705/63.cccls. or 705/401.cccls. or 705/408.cccls. or 705/405.cccls. or 705/60.cccls. or 705/410.cccls. or 705/404.cccls.) or (380/51.cccls. or 380/54.cccls.)	USPAT	2003/12/19 14:58
5	1745	postage near2 meter\$4 or frank\$4 near2 meter\$4	USPAT	2003/12/19 15:04
6	117061	seed\$3 or random near2 number	USPAT	2003/12/19 15:04
7	171	(postage near2 meter\$4 or frank\$4 near2 meter\$4) and (seed\$3 or random near2 number)	USPAT	2003/12/19 14:59
8	514709	duration or time near2 record or time near2 keep\$4 or meter\$4	USPAT	2003/12/19 15:00
9	14869	self near2 test3 or test\$3 near2 mode	USPAT	2003/12/19 15:05
10	5	((postage near2 meter\$4 or frank\$4 near2 meter\$4) and (seed\$3 or random near2 number)) and (self near2 test3 or test\$3 near2 mode)	USPAT	2003/12/19 15:02
11	2907	postage near2 meter\$4 or frank\$4 near2 meter\$4	USPAT; EPO; JPO; DERWENT	2003/12/19 15:04
12	208246	seed\$3 or random near2 number	USPAT; EPO; JPO; DERWENT	2003/12/19 15:05
13	23566	self near2 test3 or test\$3 near2 mode	USPAT; EPO; JPO; DERWENT	2003/12/19 15:05
14	5	(postage near2 meter\$4 or frank\$4 near2 meter\$4) and (seed\$3 or random near2 number) and (self near2 test3 or test\$3 near2 mode)	USPAT; EPO; JPO; DERWENT	2003/12/19 15:05

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3	549	380/51.cccls. or 380/54.cccls.	USPAT	2003/12/19 14:58
4	3882	(713/174.cccls. or 713/185.cccls. or 713/192.cccls. or 713/194.cccls. or 713/200-201.cccls. or 713/155.cccls. or 713/168.cccls.) or (705/60.cccls. or 705/62.cccls. or 705/63.cccls. or 705/401.cccls. or 705/408.cccls. or 705/405.cccls. or 705/60.cccls. or 705/410.cccls. or 705/404.cccls.) or (380/51.cccls. or 380/54.cccls.)	USPAT	2003/12/19 14:58
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13	23566	self near2 test3 or test\$3 near2 mode	USPAT; EPO; JPO; DERWENT	2003/12/19 15:05
14	5	(postage near2 meter\$4 or frank\$4 near2 meter\$4) and (seed\$3 or random near2 number) and (self near2 test3 or test\$3 near2 mode)	USPAT; EPO; JPO; DERWENT	2003/12/19 15:07
15	892	380/46.cccls. or 380/44.cccls.	USPAT; EPO; JPO; DERWENT	2003/12/19 15:08
16	7	(380/46.cccls. or 380/44.cccls.) and (postage near2 meter\$4 or frank\$4 near2 meter\$4)	USPAT; EPO; JPO; DERWENT	2003/12/19 15:08

```
### Status: Path 1 of [Dialog Information Services via Modem]
### Status: Initializing TCP/IP using (UseTelnetProto 1 ServiceID dialog.com)
Trying 31060000009999...Open

DIALOG INFORMATION SERVICES
PLEASE LOGON:
***** HHHHHHHH SSSSSSSS?
### Status: Signing onto Dialog
*****
ENTER PASSWORD:
***** HHHHHHHH SSSSSSSS? *****
Welcome to DIALOG
### Status: Connected
```

Dialog level 03.05.00D

```
Last logoff: 19dec03 11:46:23
Logon file405 19dec03 15:12:52
* * *
SYSTEM:HOME
Cost is in DialUnits
Menu System II: D2 version 1.7.9 term=ASCII
*** DIALOG HOMEBASE(SM) Main Menu ***
```

Information:

1. Announcements (new files, reloads, etc.)
2. Database, Rates, & Command Descriptions
3. Help in Choosing Databases for Your Topic
4. Customer Services (telephone assistance, training, seminars, etc.)
5. Product Descriptions

Connections:

6. DIALOG(R) Document Delivery
7. Data Star(R)

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/H = Help /L = Logoff /NOMENU = Command Mode

```
Enter an option number to view information or to connect to an online
service. Enter a BEGIN command plus a file number to search a database
(e.g., B1 for ERIC).
?b 2,6,8,34,434,35,62,65,77,99,144,94,233,238,266,15,16,239,275,621,636,647,674,9,15,14
8,624,553,267,696
```

```
>>>      77 does not exist
>>>      238 does not exist
>>>2 of the specified files are not available
      19dec03 15:14:17 User264815 Session D38.1
      $0.00    0.150 DialUnits FileHomeBase
      $0.00  Estimated cost FileHomeBase
      $0.46   TELNET
      $0.46  Estimated cost this search
      $0.46  Estimated total session cost  0.150 DialUnits
```

```
SYSTEM:OS - DIALOG OneSearch
File 2:INSPEC 1969-2003/Dec W1
(c) 2003 Institution of Electrical Engineers
*File 2: Alert feature enhanced for multiple files, duplicates
removal, customized scheduling. See HELP ALERT.
File 6:NTIS 1964-2003/Dec W3
(c) 2003 NTIS, Intl Cpyrght All Rights Res
```

File 8:Ei Compendex(R) 1970-2003/Dec W1
 (c) 2003 Elsevier Eng. Info. Inc.
 File 34:SciSearch(R) Cited Ref Sci 1990-2003/Dec W2
 (c) 2003 Inst for Sci Info
 File 434:SciSearch(R) Cited Ref Sci 1974-1989/Dec
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 (c) 2003 Japan Science and Tech Corp (JST)
 File 233:Internet & Personal Comp. Abs. 1981-2003/Jul
 (c) 2003, EBSCO Pub.
 File 266:FEDRIP 2003/Oct
 Comp & dist by NTIS, Intl Copyright All Rights Res
 File 15:ABI/Inform(R) 1971-2003/Dec 19
 (c) 2003 ProQuest Info&Learning
***File 15: Alert feature enhanced for multiple files, duplicate removal, customized scheduling. See HELP ALERT.**
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 (c) 2003 The Gale Group
***File 16: Alert feature enhanced for multiple files, duplicate removal, customized scheduling. See HELP ALERT.**
 File 239:Mathsci 1940-2003/Jan
 (c) 2003 American Mathematical Society
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 (c) 2003 The Gale Group
 File 621:Gale Group New Prod.Annou.(R) 1985-2003/Dec 18
 (c) 2003 The Gale Group
 File 636:Gale Group Newsletter DB(TM) 1987-2003/Dec 19
 (c) 2003 The Gale Group
 File 647:cmp Computer Fulltext 1988-2003/Dec W2
 (c) 2003 CMP Media, LLC
 File 674:Computer News Fulltext 1989-2003/Dec W1
 (c) 2003 IDG Communications
 File 9:Business & Industry(R) Jul/1994-2003/Dec 18
 (c) 2003 Resp. DB Svcs.
 File 148:Gale Group Trade & Industry DB 1976-2003/Dec 18
 (c) 2003 The Gale Group
***File 148: Alert feature enhanced for multiple files, duplicate removal, customized scheduling. See HELP ALERT.**
 File 624:McGraw-Hill Publications 1985-2003/Dec 18
 (c) 2003 McGraw-Hill Co. Inc
***File 624: Homeland Security & Defense and 9 Platt energy journals added**
 Please see HELP NEWS624 for more
 File 553:Wilson Bus. Abs. FullText 1982-2003/Nov
 (c) 2003 The HW Wilson Co
 File 267:Finance & Banking Newsletters 2003/Dec 15
 (c) 2003 The Dialog Corp.
 File 696:DIALOG Telecom. Newsletters 1995-2003/Dec 18
 (c) 2003 The Dialog Corp.

Set Items Description

--- -----

?s postage? (1n) meter? or frank? (1n) machine
 50613 POSTAGE?
 498581 METER?
 2609 POSTAGE? (1N) METER?
 1003207 FRANK?
 1836360 MACHINE

```


            343 FRANK? (1N) MACHINE
S1    2942 POSTAGE? (1N) METER? OR FRANK? (1N) MACHINE
?s random (2n) number? or seed
Processing
Processed 10 of 27 files ...
Completed processing all files
    1047038 RANDOM
    9901006 NUMBER?
    29286 RANDOM(2N) NUMBER?
    312384 SEED
S2 341119 RANDOM (2N) NUMBER? OR SEED
?s cryptograph? (2n) key?
Processing
Processed 20 of 27 files ...
Completed processing all files
    82970 CRYPTOGRAPH?
    4772470 KEY?
S3 18787 CRYPTOGRAPH? (2N) KEY?
?s meter? or time? or timing or duration or log?
Processing
Processing
Processed 10 of 27 files ...
Processing
Processing
Processed 20 of 27 files ...
Processing
Processing
Completed processing all files
    498581 METER?
    17174399 TIME?
    657668 TIMING
    629601 DURATION
    3348518 LOG?
S419951811 METER? OR TIME? OR TIMING OR DURATION OR LOG?
?s self (2n) test? or self (2n) mode or test?
Processing
Processing
Processed 10 of 27 files ...
Processing
Processing
Processed 20 of 27 files ...
Completed processing all files
    2274427 SELF
    9022594 TEST?
    37969 SELF(2N) TEST?
    2274427 SELF
    1733702 MODE
    7509 SELF(2N) MODE
    9022594 TEST?
S5 9029081 SELF (2N) TEST? OR SELF (2N) MODE OR TEST?
?e au=schwartz, robert

```

Ref	Items	Index-term
E1	0	*AU=SCHWARTZ, ROBERT
E2	1	AU=SCHWARTZA, J.
E3	1	AU=SCHWARTZACHER, W.
E4	53	AU=SCHWARTZALBIEZ R
E5	3	AU=SCHWARTZAND, EPHRAIM
E6	3	AU=SCHWARTZAPFEL B
E7	2	AU=SCHWARTZAPFEL BETH
E8	1	AU=SCHWARTZAPFEL BL
E9	1	AU=SCHWARTZAPFEL J A
E10	1	AU=SCHWARTZAPFEL, HAROLD B.
E11	1	AU=SCHWARTZAPFEL, JON ADAM
E12	2	AU=SCHWARTZAPFEL, W.

Enter P or PAGE for more

```
?s s3 and s1
    18787  S3
    2942   S1
    S6     38  S3 AND S1
?s s2 and s3
    341119  S2
    18787   S3
    S7     661 S2 AND S3
?s s4 and s2
Processing
Processed 10 of 27 files ...
Processing
Processed 20 of 27 files ...
Processing
Completed processing all files
    19951811  S4
    341119   S2
    S8     102910 S4 AND S2
?s s8 and s1
    102910  S8
    2942   S1
    S9     26  S8 AND S1
```


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[postage meter and random numt](#)
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Searched the web for **postage meter and random number**. Results 1 - 10 of about 54,400. Search took 0.29 sec.

[Postage Meter - Compare Prices on Postage Equipment & Save!](#)

[www.BuyerZone.com](#) **Postage Equipment for Less - Compare & Save Now.**

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[Print Postage on Your PC](#)

[www.stamps.com](#) **Save up to 80% on USPS approved **postage**. Free Digital Scale! Aff.**

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**<html> <head> </head><body><pre><html> <head>
< ...**

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... either a computer-based or **postage meter-based host** ... register) and the total **postage**

Pitney Bowes Postage
60 Days Free and \$30 Free Postage
Pitney Personal Postage Machine.
[www.pitneybowes.com](#)
Interest:

value used by ... that may contain an internal **random number** generator,
various ...

[www.ribbs.usps.gov/files/fedreg/usps96/96-15778.TXT](#) - 9k - Cached - Similar pages

[\[PDF\] Security Policy Postal Revenector Version 1.4](#)

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... The Customer is the end user of the **postal meter** that shall ... The value is changed by

Hasler® Digital Meters
Upgrade your old meter to a New
USPS approved digital postage meter
[www.haslerinc.com](#)
Interest:

every **random** generation of the **Postal** ... U D,U,ZU,Z M x **Postage Value**
Download ...

[csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/140sp/140sp348.pdf](#) - Similar pages

[Postage Meter Regulations](#)

... of the **postage**, the assigned serial **number** and, in ... access to the mechanism of the

[Postage Meter](#)

Huge Selection - Up to 69% Off List
Prices at Viking Office! Shop Here
[www.vikingop.com](#)
Interest:

postage meter can be obtained only through the use of **random** numerical or ...

[laws.justice.gc.ca/en/c-10/sor-83-748/text.html](#) - 29k - Cached - Similar pages

[Sweepstakes Frequently Asked Questions from ragstoriches ...](#)

... Is there usually a certain **number** of days that a potential ... By definition a sweepstakes

Mail Machine Supplies
Supplies for Pitney Bowes, Neopost,
Ascom Hasler, and Postalia machines
[www.mailmachinesupplies.com](#)
Interest:

is a **random** drawing. ... Can I use a **postage meter** on my sweepstakes entries ...

[www.ragstoriches.com/FAQ.htm](#) - 15k - Cached - Similar pages

[Microsoft Excel Tips Page 21](#)

... Select the cell(s) containing the **random number(s)** you want ... ALL as text -because Excel

[US Postal Rate Wall Chart](#)

24" x 19" Wallchart with current US
Postal rates, measurements, weights
[www.OfficeTimeSavers.com](#)
Interest:

can sort "text" **numbers**. ... we have no tips for rigging your **postage meter** ...

[www.tipsdr.com/Microsoft-Excel-Tips-21.html](#) - 39k - Cached - Similar pages

[Removable Media \(Internal\) - 7-14GB 8 mm Tape Drive](#)

... LEDs, POST PART 1, POST PART 2, POST FAILED, READY NO TAPE, ...
Fast LED = 4 flashes per

second (3.76Hz) Random LED = flash ... The 112 Meter Tape part **number** is

[Pitney Bowes](#)

Postage Meter/Scale Start-Up Kit
You can mail anything, any size.
[www.officedepot.com](#)
Interest:

[Postage Meter](#)

Find the best deal! Compare prices,
Reviews and More - CNET Shopper.com
[shopper.cnet.com](#)
Interest:

370-1298-01 ...

sunsolve.sun.com/handbook_pub/Devices/

Removable_Media/RMVBL_7_14GB_8mm.html - 29k - Cached - Similar pages

P stage meter

Wide Selection & Great Prices.

Buy Now!

www.ebay.com

Interest: 

Introduction

... where P is the specific post-spacing in **meters**, X a is ... 2, n can be determined at varying

nominal post-spacing in ... on x and/or y axis rather than **random** selection ...

www.cla.sc.edu/geog/rslab/751/Projects_2001/Chowte/final_project.htm - 83k - Cached - Similar pages

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Postage Meters

... when required for use in **random** surveys to ... All components except the **postage meter** may be purchased ... specifications, can automatically feed, **meter**, seal, and ...

[www\(tpub.com/content/administration/14198/css/14198_35.htm](http://www(tpub.com/content/administration/14198/css/14198_35.htm) - 26k - Cached - Similar pages

AAR: Publication: eCommerce patent bulletin: Australia - accepted ...

... a hashing operation, wherein the table of **random numbers** is generated ... the remote client computer functions as a **meter** client on the **postage metering network** ...

www.aar.com.au/pubs/patent/71/ausacc.htm - 70k - Cached - Similar pages

Monitoring Design and Analysis

... The reference **post** is on the south side of the road ... 22, 27, 32, 37, 42, and 47 **meters** along the ... of the starting point for systematic sampling must be **random**. ...

fire.r9.fws.gov/ifcc/monitor/RefGuide/study_design_and_analysis.htm - 46k - Cached - Similar pages

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
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franking machine and cryptograp

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... register sets store the amount of money to be **franked by the franking machine**. ... **Keys**

(SRDI) KE This item stands for all of the **cryptographic keys** stored inside ...
csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/140sp/140sp062.pdf - [Similar pages](#)

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Franking machine

Free Quotes from Multiple Vendors
 Save When You Compare Prices!
www.BuyerZone.com
 Interest:

Thales

... the traditional stamps or **franking machines** by using ... offices or associations, PC

franking offers its users ... range, manages the **cryptographic keys** and ensures ...

security.thalesgroup.com/case_study/case6.htm - 25k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

Key Machines

New you can buy key machines online from a 5 star Yahoo store!
<http://www.nokey.com/ooo.html>
 Interest:

[PPT] WPI Fall 2003 Semester EE579S/CS525 Computer Security

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... No place for **Frank** to get in the middle. ... A **machine** stores high-quality secret;

a person memorizes low-quality password. **Cryptographic** operations. ...
ece.wpi.edu/~wjliou/htmls/teaching/NOTE-0930.ppt - [Similar pages](#)

Key cutting machines

duplicators new and factory reconditioned. Transponder Keys.
discountkeymachines.com
 Interest:

World-Information.Org

... by WF Friedman or his colleague **Frank** Rowlett - at ... similar to the German **Enigma machine**

1943 Colossus ... Bletchley Park 1943-1980 the **cryptographic** Venona Project ...

www.world-information.org/wio/infostructure/100437611776/100438658921?opmode=contents - 41k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

Personalise Your Post

Digital Franking Machine. Worldwide free trial - just fill form. Aff
www.pitneybowes.co.uk
 Interest:

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Brute force attacks on cryptographic keys

... **Frank** Hoornaert, Jo Goubert, and Yvo Desmedt ... A **machine** to break **keys** at one per day would ... **Cryptographic** Hardware and Embedded Systems, LNCS 1717, Springer-Verlag ...
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/brute.html - 26k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[PDF] WebSentry™ Secures the First Live Electronic Stamping System

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... **Franking Machines** and Printed Stamps... A Thing of the ... of the new Public **Key** Infrastructure (PKI ... WebSentry™ Ethernet offers **Cryptographic** Acceleration, High ...
www.thales-esecurity.com/CaseStudies/Documents/Stampit_Case_Study.pdf - [Similar pages](#)

Thales e-Security solutions for electronic payments and ...

... STAMPIT service complements the traditional **franking machines** by using ... to simplify the letter **franking** process ... range, manages the **cryptographic keys** and ensures ...
www.thales-esecurity.com/Newsroom Releases2003/20020627.shtml - 26k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

IT Management: Enterprise Applications

... in Software Security By Brad Arkin **Frank Hill Scott** ... to invent special **machines** to crack **cryptographic** algorithms ... EFF created a special-purpose **machine** to crack ... itmanagement.earthweb.com/entdev/print.php/11070_616221_3 - 21k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

SINTRA - Distributing Trust on the Internet

... The service uses state-machine replication and ... Christian Cachin, Klaus Kursawe, **Frank Petzold**, and ... These **cryptographic** protocols have practical and provably ... www.zurich.ibm.com/security/dti/ - 16k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

ATIP95.42 : Cryptography & Smart Cards: Policy + Algorithms

... impossible to separate **cryptographic** technology from ... DTH) Automatic teller **machines** Electronic funds ... ticket terminals Postal **franking machines** Medical record ... www.cs.arizona.edu/japan/www/atip/public/atip.reports.95/atip95.42r.html - 33k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

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
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[Postage meter](#)

[www.BuyerZone.com](#) Free Quotes from Multiple Vendors Save When You Compare Prices!

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... order to guarantee **postage integrity**, accurate ... fraud, SPYRUS' public **k y cryptographic** technologies are ... certificate processing and electronic money **metering**. ...
[www.spyrus.com.au/content/pressroom/releases/1998/pr_neopost.asp](#) - 21k - Cached - Similar pages

[\[PDF\] Electronic Postage](#)

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
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
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


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Ray Bird , Inder Gopal , Amir Herzberg , Phil Janson , Shay Kutten , Refik Molva , Moti Yung

IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON) February 1995

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3 Security & transport: Mobility helps security in ad hoc networks 80%

Srdjan Capkun , Jean-Pierre Hubaux , Levente Buttyán

Proceedings of the 4th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing June 2003

Contrary to the common belief that mobility makes security more difficult to achieve, we show that node mobility can, in fact, be useful to provide security in ad hoc networks. We propose a technique in which security associations between nodes are established, when they are in the vicinity of each other, by exchanging appropriate cryptographic material. We show that this technique is generic, by explaining its application to fully self-organized ad hoc networks and to ad hoc networks placed und ...

4 Optimal algorithms for Byzantine agreement 80%

Paul Feldman , Silvio Micali

Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing

January 1988

We exhibit randomized Byzantine agreement (BA) algorithms achieving optimal running time and fault tolerance against all types of adversaries ever considered in the literature. Our BA algorithms do not require trusted parties, preprocessing, or non-constructive arguments. Given private communication lines, we show that n processors can reach BA in expected constant time in a synchronous network if any <

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-  David Corcoran
Linux Journal August 1998
The newest kind of card for your pocketbook offers better security for the information it holds
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-  Darko Kirovski , Miodrag Potkonjak
Proceedings of the 35th annual conference on Design automation conference May 1998
We have developed a new algorithm and software for graph coloring by systematically combining several algorithm and software development ideas that had crucial impact on the algorithm's performance. The algorithm explores the divide-and-conquer paradigm, global search for constrained independent sets using a computationally inexpensive objective function, assignment of most-constrained vertices to least-constraining colors, reuse and locality exploration of intermediate solutions, s ...
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-  Andrew D. Birrell
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS) February 1985
Volume 3 Issue 1
Research on encryption-based secure communication protocols has reached a stage where it is feasible to construct end-to-end secure protocols. The design of such a protocol, built as part of a remote procedure call package, is described. The security abstraction presented to users of the package, the authentication mechanisms, and the protocol for encrypting and verifying remote calls are also described.
- 8 A survey of key management for secure group communication** 77%
-  Sandro Rafaeli , David Hutchison
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) September 2003
Volume 35 Issue 3
Group communication can benefit from IP multicast to achieve scalable exchange of messages. However, there is a challenge of effectively controlling access to the transmitted data. IP multicast by itself does not provide any mechanisms for preventing nongroup members to have access to the group communication. Although encryption can be used to protect messages exchanged among group members, distributing the cryptographic keys becomes an issue. Researchers have proposed several different approach ...
- 9 Intrusion detection: Countering code-injection attacks with instruction-set randomization** 77%
-  Gaurav S. Kc , Angelos D. Keromytis , Vassilis Prevelakis
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communication security October 2003
We describe a new, general approach for safeguarding systems against *any* type of

code-injection attack. We apply Kerckhoff's principle, by creating process-specific randomized instruction sets (e.g., machine instructions) of the system executing potentially vulnerable software. An attacker who does not know the key to the randomization algorithm will inject code that is invalid for that randomized processor, causing a runtime exception. To determine the difficulty of integrating su ...

10 Power modeling and optimization for embedded systems: Energy- 77%

 efficient data scrambling on memory-processor interfaces

Luca Benini , Angelo Galati , Alberto Macii , Enrico Macii , Massimo Poncino

Proceedings of the 2003 international symposium on Low power electronics and design August 2003

Crypto-processors are prone to security attacks based on the observation of their power consumption profile. We propose new techniques for increasing the non-determinism of such profile, which rely on the idea of introducing randomness in the bus data transfers. This is achieved by combining data scrambling with energy-efficient bus encoding, thus providing high information protection at no energy cost. Results on a set of bus traces originated by real-life applications demonstrate the applicabil ...

11 Some cryptographic principles of authentication in electronic funds 77%

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C. H. Meyer , S. M. Matyas

Proceedings of the seventh symposium on Data communications October 1981

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Cryptographic implementations are developed for such a network in such a way as to keep personal verification and message authentication processes at diffe ...

12 Chord: a scalable peer-to-peer lookup protocol for internet applications 77%

 Ion Stoica , Robert Morris , David Liben-Nowell , David R. Karger , M. Frans Kaashoek , Frank Dabek , Hari Balakrishnan

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A fundamental problem that confronts peer-to-peer applications is the efficient location of the node that stores a desired data item. This paper presents *Chord*, a distributed lookup protocol that addresses this problem. Chord provides support for just one operation: given a key, it maps the key onto a node. Data location can be easily implemented on top of Chord by associating a key with each data item, and storing the key/data pair at the node to which the key maps. Chord adapts efficien ...

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
Proceeding of the ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society November 2002

This paper studies issues related to privacy protection of medical data, arguing that the topic is suitable for applied cryptographic research. We present the problem of medicine prescription privacy and describe a practical system that employs standard cryptographic techniques to achieve several improvements over current practices. We also introduce a very simple tool: Online group signatures which can be built via simple primitives implemented in commonly employed cryptographic libraries.

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 Adrian Perrig , Robert Szewczyk , J. D. Tygar , Victor Wen , David E. Culler
Wireless Networks September 2002
 Volume 8 Issue 5
 Wireless sensor networks will be widely deployed in the near future. While much research has focused on making these networks feasible and useful, security has received little attention. We present a suite of security protocols optimized for sensor networks: SPINS. SPINS has two secure building blocks: SNEP and μ TESLA. SNEP includes: data confidentiality, two-party data authentication, and evidence of data freshness. μ TESLA provides authenticated broadcast for severely resource-constrained ...
- 15 Key management and key exchange: A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks** 77%
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 management for wireless mobile communications
 Roberto Di Pietro , Luigi V. Mancini , Sushil Jajodia
Proceedings of the second ACM international workshop on Principles of mobile computing October 2002
 This paper presents an efficient algorithm for the secure group key management of mobile users. The most promising protocols to deal with group key management are those based on logical key hierarchy (LKH). The LKH model reduces to logarithmic size the resources needed: computation time, message exchanged, and memory space. In the framework of the LKH model, we present a new protocol LKH++ that outperforms the other proposed solutions in the literature. Such performance improvements are obtained ...
- 17 Token-based scanning of source code for security problems** 77%
 John Viega , J. T. Bloch , Tadayoshi Kohno , Gary McGraw
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) August 2002
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 We describe **ITS4**, a tool for statically scanning C and C++ source code for security vulnerabilities. Compared to other approaches, our scanning technique stakes out a new middle ground between accuracy and efficiency. This method is efficient enough to offer real-time feedback to developers during coding while producing few false negatives. Unlike other techniques, our method is also simple enough to scan C++ code despite the complexities inherent in the language. Using **ITS4**, we fo ...
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 operating systems
 Pierre Paradinas , Jean-Jacques Vandewalle
Proceedings of the 6th European ACM SIGOPS European workshop: Matching

operating systems to application needs September 1994

Integrated circuit cards or smart cards are now well-known. Applications such as electronic purses (cash units stored in cards), subscriber identification cards used in cellular telephone or access keys for pay-TV and information highways emerge in many places with millions of users. More services are required by applications providers and card holders. Mainly, new integrated circuit cards evolve towards non-predefined multi-purpose, open and multi-user applications. Today, operating systems imp ...

19 Mobile Code and Distributed Systems: A new approach to DNS security 77%

Giuseppe Ateniese , Stefan Mangard

Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security November 2001

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a distributed database that allows convenient storing and retrieving of resource records. DNS has been extended to provide security services (DNSSEC) mainly through public-key cryptography. We propose a new approach to DNSSEC that may result in a significantly more efficient protocol. We introduce a new strategy to build chains of trust from root servers to authoritative servers. The techniques we employ are based on symmetric-key cryptography.


20 Secure password-based cipher suite for TLS 77%

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) May 2001

Volume 4 Issue 2

SSL is the de facto standard today for securing end-to-end transport on the Internet. While the protocol itself seems rather secure, there are a number of risks that lurk in its use, for example, in web banking. However, the adoption of password-based key-exchange protocols can overcome some of these problems. We propose the integration of such a protocol (DH-EKE) in the TLS protocol, the standardization of SSL by IETF. The resulting protocol provides secure mutual authentication and key establi ...

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21 SPINS: security protocols for sensor netwrks 77%

Adrian Perrig , Robert Szewczyk , Victor Wen , David Culler , J. D. Tygar

Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking July 2001

As sensor networks edge closer towards wide-spread deployment, security issues become a central concern. So far, much research has focused on making sensor networks feasible and useful, and has not concentrated on security.

We present a suite of security building blocks optimized for resource-constrained environments and wireless communication. SPINS has two secure building blocks: SNEP and &mgr;TESLA SNEP provides the following important baseline security primitives: Data confidentialia ...

22 Cryptographic solution to a problem of access control in a hierarchy 77%

Selim G. Akl , Peter D. Taylor

ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS) August 1983

Volume 1 Issue 3

23 Encryption and Secure Computer Networks 77%

Gerald J. Popek , Charles S. Kline

ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) December 1979

Volume 11 Issue 4

24 Cryptographic sealing for information secrecy and authentication 77%

David K. Gifford

C mmunicati ns f the ACM April 1982

Volume 25 Issue 4

A new protection mechanism is described that provides general primitives for protection and authentication. The mechanism is based on the idea of sealing an object with a key. Sealed objects are self-authenticating, and in the absence of an appropriate set of keys, only provide information about the size of their contents. New keys can be freely created at any time, and keys can also be derived from existing keys with operators that include Key-And and Key-Or

25 Advanced cryptographic techniques for computer

77%



Dennie Van Tassel

Communications of the ACM December 1969

Volume 12 Issue 12

Cryptographic techniques which can be used to maintain the confidentiality of information processed by computers are dealt with. Special emphasis is paid to the unique characteristics of computer files that make many cryptographic methods of little use. Relative security, costs, and preferred methods are included in this paper.

26 Towards a secure platform for distributed mobile object computing

77%



Marc Lacoste

ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review April 2000

Volume 34 Issue 2

We present some issues relevant to the design of a secure platform for distributed mobile computing, that goes beyond existing ad-hoc approaches to software mobility. This platform aims to support wide-area computing applications such as active network infrastructures or network supervision tools. Our contribution is two-fold: the first part of the paper is a survey of the security features of a few languages and virtual machines as regards authentication, access control, and communications secu ...

27 Specification, validation, and synthesis of email agent controllers: A

77%



case study in function rich reactive system design

Robert J. Hall

Proceedings of the third workshop on Formal methods in software practice

August 2000

With a few exceptions, previous formal methods for reactive system design have focused on finite state machines represented in terms of boolean states and boolean next-state functions. By contrast, in many reactive system domains requirements engineers and developers think in terms of complex data types and expressive next-state functions. Formal methods for reactive system design must be extended to meet their needs as well. I term a reactive system function rich if expr ...

28 Unlinkable serial transactions: protocols and applications

77%



Stuart G. Stubblebine , Paul F. Syverson , David M. Goldschlag

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) November 1999

Volume 2 Issue 4

We present a protocol for unlinkable serial transactions suitable for a variety of network-based subscription services. It is the first protocol to use cryptographic blinding to enable subscription services. The protocol prevents the service from tracking the behavior of its customers, while protecting the service vendor from abuse due to simultaneous or cloned use by a single subscriber. Our basic protocol structure and recovery protocol are robust against failure in protocol termination. ...

77%

29 Using smartcards to secure a personalized gambling device

 William A. Aiello , Aviel D. Rubin , Martin J. Strauss

Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security November 1999

We introduce a technique for using an untrusted device, such as a hand-held personal digital assistant or a laptop to perform real financial transactions without a network. We utilize the tamper-resistant nature of smartcards to store value on them and perform probabilistic computations based on user input. We discuss an application of this to gambling. The technique has the properties that the user is guaranteed to make money when he wins and the house is guaranteed to make money w ...

30 The proactive security toolkit and applications

77%

 Boaz Barak , Amir Herzberg , Dalit Naor , Eldad Shai

Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security November 1999

Existing security mechanisms focus on prevention of penetrations, detection of a penetration and (manual) recovery tools. Indeed attackers focus their penetration efforts on breaking into critical modules, and on avoiding detection of the attack. As a result, security tools and procedures may cause the attackers to lose control over a specific module (computer, account), since the attacker would rather lose control than risk detection of the attack. While controlling the module, attacker may ...

31 A public-key based secure mobile IP

77%

 John Zao , Joshua Gahm , Gregory Troxel , Matthew Condell , Pam Helinek , Nina Yuan , Isidro Castineyra , Stephen Kent

Wireless Networks October 1999

Volume 5 Issue 5

32 Smart Cards and Biometrics: The cool way to make secure transactions

77%

 David Corcoran , David Sims , Bob Hillhouse

Linux Journal March 1999

33 Server-assisted cryptography

77%

 Donald Beaver

Proceedings of the 1998 workshop on New security paradigms January 1998

34 Simplified VSS and fast-track multiparty computations with applications

77%

 to threshold cryptography

Rosario Gennaro , Michael O. Rabin , Tal Rabin

Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing June 1998

35 Proactive public key and signature systems

77%

 Amir Herzberg , Markus Jakobsson , Stanisław Jarecki , Hugo Krawczyk , Moti Yung

Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security April 1997

36 Verifiable partial key escrow

77%

 Mihir Bellare , Shafi Goldwasser

Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security

security April 1997

- 37** A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus 77%
[A] Martín Abadi , Andrew D. Gordon
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security April 1997
- 38** A public-key based secure mobile IP 77%
[A] John Zao , Stephen Kent , Joshua Gahm , Gregory Troxel , Matthew Condell , Pam Helinek , Nina Yuan , Isidro Castineyra
Proceedings of the 3rd annual ACM/IEEE international conference on Mobile computing and networking September 1997
- 39** Maintaining authenticated communication in the presence of break-ins 77%
[A] Ran Canetti , Shai Halevi , Amir Herzberg
Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing August 1997
- 40** Securing ATM networks 77%
[A] Shaw-Cheng Chuang
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security January 1996

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41 Securing the internet protocol 77% 

Pau-Chen Cheng , Juan A. Garay , Amir Herzberg , Hugo Krawczyk
Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing August 1995

42 New directions for integrated circuit cards operating systems 77% 

Pierre Paradinas , Jean-Jacques Vandewalle
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review January 1995
Volume 29 Issue 1

Integrated circuit cards or smart cards are now well-known. Applications such as electronic purses (cash units stored in cards), subscriber identification cards used in cellular telephone or access keys for pay-TV and information highways emerge in many places with millions of users. More services are required by applications providers and card holders. Mainly, new integrated circuit cards evolve towards non-predefined multi-purpose, open and multi-user applications. Today, operating systems imp ...

43 Authentication in the Taos operating system 77% 

Edward Wobber , Martín Abadi , Michael Burrows , Butler Lampson
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS) February 1994
Volume 12 Issue 1

We describe a design for security in a distributed system and its implementation. In our design, applications gain access to security services through a narrow interface. This interface provides a notion of identity that includes simple principals, groups, roles, and delegations. A new operating system component manages principals, credentials, and secure channels. It checks credentials according to the formal rules of a logic of authentication. Our implementation is efficient enough to sup ...

44 Extending cryptographic logics of belief to key agreement protocols 77%

 Paul van Oorschot

Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications security December 1993

The authentication logic of Burrows, Abadi and Needham (BAN) provided an important step towards rigorous analysis of authentication protocols, and has motivated several subsequent refinements. We propose extensions to BAN-like logics which facilitate, for the first time, examination of public-key based authenticated key establishment protocols in which both parties contribute to the derived key (i.e. key agreement protocols). Attention is focussed on six distinct generic goals for authenti ...

45 Conditionally secure secret sharing schemes with disenrollment 77%

 capability

Chris Charnes , Josef Pieprzyk , Rei Safavi-Naini

Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Computer and communications security November 1994

The paper describes an implementation of Shamir secret sharing schemes based on exponentiation in Galois fields. It is shown how to generate shares so the scheme has the disenrollment capability. Next a family of conditionally secure Shamir schemes is defined and the disenrollment capability is investigated for the family. The paper also examines a problem of covert channels which are present in any secret sharing scheme.

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